Assessment Brief: Critical Analysis of Red Sea Maritime Security and the Suez Canal Crisis
1. Module Context and Rationale
This assessment forms part of a module sequence designed to equip students with the analytical capacity to evaluate real-world disruptions to international maritime trade, security governance, and legal frameworks. The focus on the Red Sea crisis reflects the module’s core commitment to applied, evidence-based inquiry: rather than treating maritime law and security as abstract constructs, students are expected to interrogate how those frameworks perform under operational stress.
Since November 2023, Houthi insurgent attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have constituted one of the most significant disruptions to global maritime trade in decades. Rodríguez-Díaz et al. (2024) document a marked decline in vessel traffic through the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal, with carriers rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope at considerable cost. That rerouting has added approximately 10–14 days to Asia-Europe voyages, raised insurance premiums across the board, and reduced Suez Canal transits from around 2,068 vessels per month in November 2023 to approximately 877 by October 2024. The legal, commercial, and geopolitical dimensions of this crisis cut across maritime safety, freedom of navigation, international humanitarian law, supply chain resilience, and port operations — exactly the terrain this module covers.
Students are expected to draw on module readings, primary treaty texts including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) instruments, and current peer-reviewed scholarship to construct a coherent, critically reasoned argument.
2. Assessment Task Description
Write a 2,500–3,000-word critical essay that addresses the following question:
“To what extent does the international maritime legal framework adequately protect the freedom of navigation and global supply chain resilience in light of the Red Sea crisis (2023–2025)? With reference to UNCLOS, IMO instruments, and relevant geopolitical developments in the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the wider Arabian Sea region, critically evaluate the challenges posed by the Houthi insurgency and assess the effectiveness of multilateral maritime security responses.”
Your essay must go beyond description. A strong submission will identify tensions, contradictions, or gaps in the legal or operational frameworks examined, and will use specific evidence — vessel incidents, traffic data, treaty provisions, case law or arbitration decisions where available — to support its analytical claims.
3. Learning Outcomes Assessed
This assessment is designed to evaluate your achievement of the following module learning outcomes:
- Critically analyse the provisions of UNCLOS and IMO conventions in the context of contemporary maritime security threats.
- Evaluate the geopolitical, operational, and legal dimensions of major disruptions to international maritime trade routes.
- Assess the adequacy and limitations of multilateral maritime security responses, including coalition operations and UN Security Council resolutions.
- Apply analytical frameworks from maritime security studies to a specific real-world case study with regional and global implications.
- Communicate complex maritime security arguments in clear, appropriately referenced academic prose.
4. Task Requirements and Structure Guidance
Your essay does not require a strict section-by-section structure, but the following elements must be addressed. You may integrate them as your argument develops.
4.1 Introduction (approximately 250–350 words)
Establish the scope and significance of the Red Sea crisis. Introduce your central argument (thesis). Briefly signpost the structure of the essay. Avoid reproducing background detail that should appear in the main body.
4.2 The Legal Framework: UNCLOS and Freedom of Navigation
Address the following within your analytical discussion:
- The right of innocent passage and transit passage through international straits under UNCLOS Articles 17–44, with specific reference to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea as transit zones.
- The scope and limits of flag state jurisdiction versus coastal state enforcement powers in the relevant maritime zones.
- Whether the Houthi attacks constitute a violation of international law — including UNCLOS, the 1988 SUA Convention (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation), and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (notably Resolution 2722, January 2024).
- The legal classification of Houthi forces and the application of international humanitarian law to non-state actors conducting maritime attacks.
4.3 Geopolitical Dimensions and Regional Context
- The strategic importance of the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, and Red Sea corridor to global trade, with particular reference to GCC energy exports, container shipping, and LNG flows through the Arabian Sea.
- The role of regional actors — Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt — and their respective positions in the crisis.
- The expanding threat zone: you should discuss the significance of the Houthi’s phased escalation from attacks on Israel-linked vessels (Phase 1, November 2023) through to the expansion targeting vessels linked to the United States, United Kingdom, and broader global operators (Phases 3–5, 2024).
- Where relevant, comparative reference to comparable chokepoint vulnerabilities — the Strait of Hormuz, Malacca Strait, Panama Canal — may strengthen your contextual analysis.
4.4 Multilateral Security Responses: Effectiveness and Limitations
- Critically assess Operation Prosperity Guardian (US-led) and Operation Aspides (EU-led) in terms of mandate, legal basis, operational reach, and measurable impact on attack frequency.
- Evaluate the adequacy of UN Security Council Resolution 2722 (January 2024) and the constraints of collective action given geopolitical divisions among permanent members.
- Assess the role of the IMO and BIMCO guidance issued during the crisis period, including industry responses such as the War Risk Area designations and changes to P&I Club coverage terms.
- Analyse the industry response: the shift of major carriers (Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, CMA CGM) to Cape of Good Hope rerouting — and what this reveals about the gap between legal frameworks and operational reality.
4.5 Implications for Supply Chain Resilience and Maritime Operations
- Quantify where possible the economic impact: increased freight rates, fuel costs, journey times, and effects on Egyptian Suez Canal revenues (estimated at $9.4 billion annually pre-crisis).
- Discuss what the crisis reveals about the structural vulnerability of just-in-time global supply chains to geopolitical shocks at maritime chokepoints.
- Consider the longer-term implications for shipping route planning, insurance frameworks, and port capacity management — particularly at regional hubs such as Port Said, Jebel Ali (Dubai), Salalah (Oman), and Djibouti.
4.6 Conclusion (approximately 250–350 words)
Synthesise your findings into a clear response to the essay question. Identify the most significant gaps or failures in the international framework. You may propose reasoned reforms or improvements — but ensure any recommendations are grounded in the evidence presented rather than speculation.
5. Specific Requirements
- The essay must be written in continuous academic prose. Bullet points, numbered lists, or subheadings within the essay body are not permitted unless used to present treaty article references within a legal analysis section.
- A minimum of ten (10) academic or authoritative sources must be cited. At least six (6) must be peer-reviewed journal articles or book chapters published between 2020 and 2025. Legal instruments (UNCLOS, SUA Convention, UNSC Resolutions) do not count toward this minimum but must be correctly cited in full.
- All data cited (vessel traffic volumes, freight rates, cargo values) must be attributed to a named source — Lloyd’s List Intelligence, BIMCO, UNCTAD, IMF Portwatch, or equivalent. Unattributed statistics will be penalised.
- The essay must engage critically with at least one counterargument — for example, the position that existing UNCLOS provisions are adequate and that the enforcement deficit rather than the legal framework is the primary problem.
- Students based in UAE, GCC, or Middle Eastern institutions are encouraged (though not required) to include specific reference to relevant GCC maritime security initiatives and the role of regional ports in the crisis response.
- Word count must be stated on the title page. The permitted range is 2,500–3,000 words. Submissions outside this range by more than 10% will be penalised in accordance with university assessment regulations.
6. Marking Criteria and Grading Rubric
| Criterion | Weight | Distinction (70%+) | Merit (60–69%) | Pass (50–59%) | Fail (<50%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical Analysis and Argument Depth, originality, and coherence of the central argument |
30% | Sustained, original critical analysis; argument is well-defined, nuanced, and consistently supported by evidence throughout. | Clear argument with competent critical analysis; occasional lapses into description rather than evaluation. | Argument present but underdeveloped; predominantly descriptive with limited critical engagement. | No clear argument; largely descriptive or incoherent. |
| Knowledge and Understanding Legal frameworks, geopolitical context, operational dimensions |
25% | Accurate, detailed command of UNCLOS provisions, IMO instruments, operational facts, and geopolitical dynamics; evidence of reading beyond module materials. | Sound understanding of key legal and operational issues; minor gaps or occasional inaccuracies. | Basic understanding of the main issues; some factual errors or omission of key frameworks. | Significant gaps in knowledge; factual inaccuracies or misapplication of legal provisions. |
| Use of Evidence and Sources Quality, range, and integration of sources |
20% | Excellent range of credible, current sources; evidence integrated analytically rather than quoted passively; data attributed accurately to named sources. | Good range of relevant sources; mostly well-integrated; minor citation or attribution issues. | Adequate number of sources but limited range; some over-reliance on a single source or descriptive quotation. | Insufficient sources; over-reliance on web sources or unattributed data; minimum requirements not met. |
| Structure, Clarity, and Coherence Organisation, paragraph logic, academic register |
15% | Logically structured throughout; paragraphs develop a clear function; academic register maintained consistently; transitions are controlled and purposeful. | Generally well-organised with minor structural weaknesses; academic register mostly maintained. | Adequate structure but some sections poorly ordered or underdeveloped; register occasionally informal. | Poor structure; difficult to follow; significant lapses in academic register. |
| Referencing Accuracy Consistent, correct Harvard/APA 7th formatting |
10% | Referencing is correct, complete, and consistent throughout; legal instruments cited accurately. | Minor referencing errors that do not impede understanding; generally consistent. | Noticeable referencing errors; inconsistent formatting; some missing in-text citations. | Frequent referencing errors or significant omissions; inability to distinguish in-text citation from reference list format. |
7. Submission Instructions
- Submit via the module’s Turnitin submission link on Blackboard / Canvas / Moodle.
- File format: Microsoft Word (.docx) or PDF. Title page must include: student ID number (not name), module code, module title, essay title, word count, and submission date.
- Do not include your name on any page of the submission — your student ID is used for anonymous marking.
- Late submissions without an approved extension will be penalised in accordance with the university’s late submission policy (typically a deduction of 5 marks per day or equivalent).
- Extensions must be applied for through the university’s mitigating circumstances process before the submission deadline.
8. Guidance Notes and Academic Support
On selecting a position
Many students make the mistake of treating the essay question as a request for a summary of the crisis. It is not. The question asks you to evaluate the adequacy of legal frameworks. That requires you to take a defensible position — for instance, that UNCLOS was never designed for non-state actor threats of this kind and that its Article 100 obligations (on suppression of piracy) do not neatly apply to politically motivated maritime attacks by an insurgent movement. Alternatively, you might argue the opposite: that the framework is adequate but that political paralysis in the UN Security Council, not legal deficiency, is the operative failure. Either position can earn a distinction, provided it is sustained by evidence.
On use of statistics
Freight rate data, vessel traffic volumes, and revenue figures change rapidly. Use the most current data available and cite the specific source and date of retrieval. IMF Portwatch (portwatch.imf.org), BIMCO’s market reports, and Lloyd’s List Intelligence are all appropriate primary sources for shipping data.
On UNCLOS and non-state actors
A common weakness in student essays is assuming UNCLOS applies uniformly to non-state actors. UNCLOS primarily governs state-to-state obligations. Engagement with scholarly commentary on this gap — for example, the Cambridge Core article by Bueger et al. (2024) on maritime security governance assemblages — will strengthen your analysis considerably.
Key module resources
- UNCLOS (United Nations, 1982) — full text available at un.org/depts/los
- IMO Maritime Security (ISPS Code, MSC circulars) — imo.org
- BIMCO Red Sea Guidance (2024) — bimco.org
- IMF Portwatch Suez Canal Monitor — portwatch.imf.org/pages/chokepoint1
- UN Security Council Resolution 2722 (2024) — undocs.org/S/RES/2722(2024)
Sample Answer Content – research study bay notes
The Red Sea crisis that erupted in November 2023 did not create the vulnerabilities it exposed — it revealed them. When Houthi forces began targeting commercial vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the international community reached quickly for the legal instruments at hand: UNCLOS, UN Security Council Resolution 2722, the SUA Convention. Each offered partial tools, but none had been architected for an insurgent movement deploying anti-ship ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones against third-party commercial shipping in a recognised international strait. Rodríguez-Díaz et al. (2024, p. 1900) document how maritime activity in the Gulf of Aden declined sharply in direct correlation with the Houthi attacks, and note the geographic and geopolitical challenges this created for one of the world’s most critical trade corridors. The legal framework’s first and most obvious limitation is jurisdictional: UNCLOS creates obligations between states, yet the Houthis are a non-state actor operating from territory they control but whose internationally recognised government remains distinct from them. Applying the Article 100 duty to cooperate in the suppression of piracy is further complicated by the political motivation of the attacks, which — under the 1982 definition in Article 101 — arguably excludes them from piracy classification because piracy requires acts committed for private ends. The result is a framework mismatch that multilateral operations like Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides have tried to fill through force authorisation derived from UNSC Resolution 2722, yet that resolution itself was constrained by geopolitical divisions among Security Council permanent members that limited its operative language.
It is worth noting that the economic consequences of this legal and operational gap have been substantial and measurable. Egypt’s Suez Canal Authority reported revenues falling sharply through 2024 — the canal, which historically contributes roughly $9.4 billion annually to the Egyptian economy, saw monthly transits drop from 2,068 in November 2023 to approximately 877 by October 2024 according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence data cited across multiple academic and policy sources. Meanwhile, the International Crisis Group (2025) has observed that the rerouting of container ships via the Cape of Good Hope added between 10 and 14 days to Asia-Europe voyages, translating into approximately $1 million in additional fuel costs per voyage and contributing to a freight rate spike that affected automotive, electronics, and agricultural supply chains across multiple continents. These figures are not background context for the legal analysis — they are its stakes. Any argument about the adequacy of UNCLOS must be tested against the question of whether the framework’s enforcement architecture, even if legally coherent, produces outcomes capable of keeping critical trade lanes open in the face of sustained hybrid maritime threats.
9. References / Learning Materials
- Rodríguez-Díaz, C.L., Martín-Alcalde, E., Saurí, S., and Núñez-Sánchez, R. (2024) ‘Challenges and security risks in the Red Sea: impact of Houthi attacks on maritime traffic’, Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 12(11), p. 1900. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse12111900
- Bueger, C., Edmunds, T. and Stockbruegger, J. (2024) Securing the Seas: A Comprehensive Assessment of Global Maritime Security. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Available at: https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Securing_the_seas_web-1.pdf
- McLaughlin, R. (2024) ‘Different pacta or different servanda? Grey-zone lawfare and law of the sea-based passage and operational rights’, Ocean Development and International Law, 55(3), pp. 329–351. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2024.2363244
- Notteboom, T., Pallis, A. and Rodrigue, J-P. (2022) Port Economics, Management and Policy. New York: Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429318184
- International Crisis Group (2025) Calming the Red Sea’s Turbulent Waters — Middle East Report No. 248. Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/248-calming-red-seas-turbulent-waters
- Mensah, T.A. and Churchill, R. (eds) (2022) The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary, 3rd edn. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff.